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Abstract
In this article, I investigate the use of Bayesian updating rules applied
to modeling social agents in the case of continuos opinions models. Given
another agent statement about the continuous value of a variable x, we will
see that interesting dynamics emerge when an agent assigns a likelihood
to that value that is a mixture of a Gaussian and a Uniform distribution.
This represents the idea the other agent might have no idea about what
he is talking about. The effect of updating only the first moments of the
distribution will be studied. and we will see that this generates results
similar to those of the Bounded Confidence models. By also updating the
second moment, several different opinions always survive in the long run.
However, depending on the probability of error and initial uncertainty,
those opinions might be clustered around a central value.
1 Introduction
Opinion Dynamics [2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 11, 5, 8] aims to understand how simple
interactions between artificial agents can describe the aspects we observe on the
opinions of social groups. Typical models describe opinions as either discrete [6,
7, 12, 11] or continuous [5, 8, 1, 14, 4] variables. Under those models, the
interacting agents observe the complete opinion of each of the other agents they
interact with. However, this is not necessarily the case and agents might not
express their opinions fully, due to verbalization problems[13].
In an earlier work, I have explore the use of Bayesian updating rules in the
context of binary expression of choices, with a continuous underlying proba-
bility associated to each choice, the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions
(CODA) model [9, 10]. That is, the verbalization in CODA is limited to two
choices. Each agent had a continuous opinion, a probability that one of two
choices was the best one, but only observed the discrete choices of its neigh-
bors. That allowed the modelling of the emergence of extremism, even when no
extremist agents were observed initially.
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In this paper, the application of Bayesian rules to a purely continuous prob-
lem, with no verbalization problems, will be studies. The objective is to compare
the results we obtain when using Bayesian rules, as in the CODA model, with
the results of traditional continuous opinion models. Here, agents tell their con-
tinous estimate about the value of a variable x to each other and change their
minds according to update rules obtained as approximations to the Bayesian
inference problem. By comparing the results of the Bayesian update with tra-
ditional continuous models, we will see that bounded confidence models corre-
spond to the case where only the first moment of the opinion distribution is
updated. In that case, we will see that Bayesian models provide basically the
same qualitative features of the bounded confidence models and that one can
recover the bounded confidence update rule as an approximation. By also up-
dating the second moment, new features of opinion evoltuion will be observed
and we will see that, in the long run, the agents tend to become very certain
about their own choices.
2 Bayesian Update for Continuous Variables
Draw two agents at random and let them exchange their views on the value
of a continuous variable x, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. This might represent the case
where agents speak about their inner probabilities or when they try to reach
a consensus about the value of some continuous parameter, rescaled to that
interval. In bounded confidence models [5, 8], this problem is represented by
each agent i having a continuous opinion xi about the value of a parameter θ.
As they interact, they change their opinions towards that of the other agent (or
agents), as long as the difference between their opinions, |xi − xj | is not above
a certain threshold .
To obtain an approximation to a Bayesian inference of this problem, we need
to express the initial opinion of each agent as a prior probability distribution
fi(θ), such that Ei[θ] = xi, where Ei means the expected value agent i associates
with θ, given its probabilistic opinion fi. The function fi(θ) will, of course, be
altered as the agent observes the average estimates xj of other agents, leading
to a new, posterior distribution, f(θ|xj). One of the simplest possible choices
is to model the initial prior opinion as a Normal distribution. That means that
the opinion fi(θ) of agent i should include not only an average xi, but also an
uncertainty σi, to be used as the standard deviation of the Normal opinion.
As an agent observes that his neighbor average estimate is xj , it will need a
likelihood funtion that models how likely it is for the neighbor to have that
average estimate as a function of the true value of the parameter θ, that is, an
estimate for f(xj |θ).
A true likelihood would have to model how the value of θ influences xj . Since
xj is also influenced by j interactions with other agents, that fact, in a complete
model, would also have to be included. And that means agent i would have to
model how agent j models every other agent and how many interactions j has
had so far, including his model of how i reasons. However, although correct,
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from a Bayesian point of view, this regress might not be a reasonable description
of real agents. And one should not forget the goal of looking for simple models.
Therefore, simpler likelihoods are needed.
The first simple idea is, of course, to use a Normal distribution for the
likelihood, with an average at xj . One extra level of detailing is still needed to
define the likelihood and that is how close xj is likely to be to the true value of θ.
A natural candidate for that role is the uncertainty σj of neighbor j. Assuming
i knows the value of σj , this likelihood N(xj , σ2j ) will change fi(θ) to f(θ|xj , σj)
that is also a Normal distribution. The average opinion of agent i becomes x′i,
given by the weighted average of xi and xj
x′i =
xi
σ2
i
+ xj
σ2
j
1
σ2
i
+ 1
σ2
j
. (1)
If one assumes that agents do not share information about their uncertainty, as
we will, from this point on, a reasonable assumption for agent i is that σi = σj .
That is, agent i assumes that the neighbor knowledge is as good as its own. In
this case, Equation 1 becomes a simple average between xi and xj .
Unfortunately, the model that we get from this is trivial, even when σi 6= σj .
If one assumes no social structure and that both interacting agents update
their opinions, as in the bounded confidence models, it is easy to see that this
description will converge to a single value in the long run. The introduction of a
social structure will not solve the problem, since no true boundaries will appear.
In the CODA model, the dissention and the opposing extremist opinions appear
because when an agent observes a neighbor that disagrees, that agent will move
only a fixed step towards the opposite direction. For Equation 1, the further
the opinions are, the larger the movement each agent makes towards each other
and, therefore, there is no strenghtening of the domains. Two agents who have
far opinions have a stronger influence on each other than agents with similar
opinions. This needs to be corrected, if we mean to model the way real people
think.
3 Fixed Uncertainty
In order to get a more interesting and realistic model, a mechanism similar to
those of the bounded confidence models is required. In those models, agents i
and j would only change their opinions when their opinions were not too distant,
that is, when |xi − xj | is smaller than a threshold . It is this lack of influence
of too distant opinions that allows different points of view to survive in the long
run. Therefore, it would be interesting to develop a similar mechanism.
We can understand that the reason why agents with very different opinions
fail to interact is related to the fact that agents might not trust someone whose
opinion is too different of their own. For a Bayesian model, there is a natural way
to express the same concern. This can be achieved by introducing a probability
p that the other agent actually knows something about θ. When that happens,
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the likelihood can be modelled as the Normal distribution of the the non-error
case. But there will be a 1−p chance that the other agent has no real information
about θ. In this case, instead of a Normal likelihood, peaked around the opinion
xj of the other agent, it would make more sense to choose a non-informative
likelihood. Therefore, we can use the likelihood
f(xj |θ) = pN(θ, σ2j ) + (1− p)U(0, 1), (2)
whereN(θ, σ2j ) represents the Normal distribution centered around θ and U(0, 1)
represents an uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
We are, as stated before, assuming that only information about xi is ex-
changed. Therefore, the values of σi need to be guessed. Again, we can make
the reasonable assumption that all agents have similar uncertainty. From now
on, whenever an agent interacts with another, it will assume that the uncertainty
associated with the Normal part of the likelihood of the other agent is equal to
its own uncertainty. With this, we can multiply the likelihood in Equation 2 by
the Normal prior discussed before, in order to obtain a posterior distribution.
Each term in Equation 2 contributes as one Normal term in the posterior, that
is a mixture of two Normals. That is,
f(θ|xj) ∝ pe
− 1
2σ2
i
[(θ−xi)2+(xi−θ)2]
+ (1− p)e−
(xi−xj)2
2σ2
i (3)
It is important to notice that, since we are actually using hierarchical Bayesian
models, the normalization constants have to be used and can no longer be
ignored in teh calculations. The second term is a Normal distribution with
an average equal to the prior average xi; it is equivalent to the result where
no change happens, because the agent believes the other agent might knows
nothing. The other Normal corresponds to the interaction case, where the agents
opinions tend to each other. After rearranging the terms in the exponentials,
we can calculate the expected value of θ in Equation 3, Ei[θ], and we see that
xi(t) is transformed to
xi(t+ 1) = p∗
xi(t) + xj(t)
2
+ (1− p∗)xi(t) (4)
where
p∗ =
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i
p 1√
2piσi
e
− (xi(t)−xj(t))
2
2σ2
i + (1− p)
. (5)
Notice that the posterior average is an average between xi(t)+xj(t)2 , the result
one would expect if there were no agents who know nothing about θ, and just
xi(t), that corresponds to the possibility that the other agent knows nothing.
However, the weight to each possibility is not given by p, but by an altered
value p∗. If xi(t) − xj(t) is small when compared to
√
2σi, the first term in
the denominator of Equation 5 will be larger than the second term and p∗ will
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become closer to 1 than p, meaning that agents with similar minds will tend to
the average between their opinions. On the other hand, as xi(t)−xj(t) becomes
larger, the numerator becomes smaller and, for xi(t) − xj(t) large enough, it
will tend to zero, while the denomiator tends to a constant value (1−p). Under
these circumstances, the agents i and j will influence each other very weakly.
Some influence will always exist, unlike the bounded confidence models, but it
can be negligible.
A number of simulations were performed where each agent only updates its
average opinion about θ, that is, its value xi and nothing else. Simulations were
run for p = 0.7 as well as p = 0.99, and only minor quantitative differences were
observed. This seems to suggest that the exact value of p is not so important.
Apparently, p has an impact in the velocity agents change their minds. Figure 1
shows the evolution of the opinions of 10,000 agents when all of them keep
their uncertainty constant, for p = 0.7. It shows two cases, for σ = 0.02,
corresponding to a population that is reasonably certain about their opinions,
and σ = 0.1, that represents a larger uncertainty. We can see that, in the first
case, the final state converges to seven different opinions and that this final
state is stable. For a larger uncertainty, on the other hand, the agents are able
to reach consensus. Those results are qualitatively the same as that previously
observed in the bounded confidence models [5, 8].
In the bounded confidence case, the threshold  was the parameter that
controlled how many opinions survived in the end. Here, the initial uncertainty
σ plays the role of the threshold. The use of Normal distribution as basis for the
interaction was studied by Deffuant [4], in the Gaussian Bounded Confidence
model, but the actual details of the update rule in that study are different from
Equation . For small values of the uncertainty, p∗ will tend to zero even for small
distances between the opinions, while a large σ means that distant opinions can
still influence each other. Figure 2 shows the average number of final observed
opinions as a function of the uncertainty σ. Notice that for σ ≥ 0.1, only one
final opinion was observed in all cases; as σ → 0, the surviving number of
opinions increases fast.
4 Evolving Uncertainty
It is interesting to notice that one simple next step towards a more complex
agent is to update one more variable as the agents interact. After updating
the first momentum of the distribution for θ, it is natural to ask what happens
what happens when the second momentum is also updated, that is, when the
uncertainty associated with that value also changes. It is easy to see that Equa-
tion 3 is still valid, since it is the correct inference about the first momentum.
The only difference now is that the agents will also update their uncertainty to
match the variance of the posterior and this will influence the future evolution
of the first momentum. A similar change in the threshold  was implemented
by Weisbuch et al [14] in the context of bounded confidence models.
By estimating σ2i = E[θ
2]−E[θ]2 from the posterior in Equation 3, the new
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uncertainty σi(t+ 1) becomes, after some straightforward calculations,
σ2i (t+ 1) = σ
2
i (t)
(
1− p
∗
2
)
+ p∗(1− p∗)
(
xi(t)− xj(t)
2
)2
. (6)
Figure 3 shows the time evolution of the opinion of the agents when they also
update their uncertainty. Here we observe a different dynamics than those we
have observed for constant uncertainty. The agents tend to the central opinion.
However, while most of the agents end near 0.5 (in that specific run, the final
average of the opinions of the agents was 0.4977 and the standard deviation,
0.0072), we still observe a few agents who final opinion is far from the average
value. As a matter of fact, the smallest observed value of p in that run was
p = 0.2627 and the largest, p = 0.5994. That is, in the end, even one opinion
more than 32 standard deviations from the average one survived.
Another interesting characteristic of this model can be observed in the second
panel of Figure 3, where a zoom to the region of opinions between 0.5 and 0.501
is shown. At a very small scale, the final opinions do not actually converge,
but they separate into a myriad of different, although very close, values. This
effect can be better observed in Figure 4, where 20,000 agents were left to
interact longer (10,000,000 total interactions), so that this effect could be better
visualized. Only the region betweem 0.5095 and 0.51 is shown, in order to see
the fine details. While some agents still change their opinions at this level of
detail, the changes become rarer and smaller with time. During the beginning of
the simulation, the opinions changed wildly and no straight lines were observed.
Around 3 to million interactions after the start, each opinion become more stable
and this process goes on.
What is really happening is that Equation 6 leads to a decrease in the un-
certainty with time. This effect was partially described in Weisbuch model [14]
by the fact that agents with smaller thresholds would change their threshold
less than agents with larger thresholds. However, in that model, the threshold
would never end smaller than the smallest of the agents thresholds. Here, the
interaction will cause initially identical uncertainties to become different, due
to the dynamics of the model, and they will also become much smaller than any
of the uncertainties introduced at t = 0.
This dimishing tendency is easy to see by analysing the two terms of Equa-
tion 6. Notice that the first term causes the uncertainty to either remain the
same (when p∗ = 0) or to decrease. The minimum value for one interaction
is half the previous one, when p∗ ≈ 1. The second term could, in principle,
make the uncertainty becomes larger, since it is always a positive contribution.
However, when p∗ is close to 1 or 0, the second term becomes close to zero. For
intermediary values of p∗, it actually slows down the diminishing of σi, but its
effect is not strong enough and, in the long run, σi → 0. In the simulation run
shown in Figure 4, the initial uncertainty was 0.1 and, at the end of the simu-
lation, the agents had an average uncertainty of σ¯i = 1.59 · 10−5. This means
that only very close opinions will be able to influence each other and, as they
do, σi will become even smaller. In the n → ∞ limit, of infinite agents, there
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should always be a close enough agent so that some change might still happen,
but, those changes will be smaller and smaller.
While the final opinions become rigid, it is interesting to measure the spread
of the final state. Figure 5 shows the standard deviation of the final opinions for
different values of the initial uncertainty. We can see that, as the initial uncer-
tainty becomes smaller and closer to zero, the final opinions tend not to change
and the initial uniform standard deviation (1/
√
12 ≈ 0.289) is preserved. For
larger amounts of initial uncertainty, however, a tendency to more central opin-
ions is observed, indicated by the fast decrease of the standard deviation of the
final opinions. However, the final standard deviation seems to only tend to zero
when the initial uncertainty tends to infinity, and that was confirmed by other
simulations with a larger initial value for σi. The problem is related with the fact
that the uncertainty of the agents decrease fast when they actually change their
opinions and, therefore, a state with small uncertainty is soon achieved. That
state prevents the final standard deviation of decreasing further and it seems it
never becomes really zero. It can still be very small, of course, indicating a final
state where the population have close, but not identical, opinions.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the behavior of the standard deviation
shown in Figure 5 do not depend or depend only very weakly on the number
of agents. A simulation with as little as n = 200 agents obtained not only the
same general shape of the curve, but, basically, the same final values with only
very small differences, whithin the error bars.
5 Conclusions
We have seen that Bayesian rules can also provide a way to model the change
in the opinion of agents when the information that is exchanged between the
agents is continuous. If we approximate Equation 5 by a step function, with
values of 0 or 1, depending on how close xi and xi are, we recover the results
of bounded confidence models. That is, the bounded confidence models can
be seen an approximation to a fixed uncertainty model described here. We
have seen that the same qualitative description is obtained and that the ini-
tial uncertainty σ is the parameter that is equivalent to the threshold  of the
bounded confidence models. We have also shown that, by updating the second
momentum, we get a model that is analogous to the update of the threshold in
Weisbuch et al [14]. This makes it possible to clearly identify the threshold as an
approximation to the second momentum of the probability distribution an agent
might have about the variable that is discussed. With the current exercise, one
of the good qualities of using Bayesian rules became evident. By understanding
what approximations we have to do in order to obtain the traditional results of
bounded confidence models, we gain a better understanding of those models as
well as a natural way to propose more complex models. This can be achieved
by avoiding one or more approximations.
We should notice that, even when updating the uncertainty, we are still
far from a correct inference, since the true posterior distribution is a mixture
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distribution but the agents only record the two first moments. By forgetting
everything but the two momenta from one interaction to the next one, a Normal
distribution is actually the choice that maximizes entropy. Therefore, it makes
sense to use it to approximate the inference proccess, but it is important to
notice that the prior used in the next interaction is not the posterior of the pre-
vious one. Still, this new, a little more sophisticated, model showed interesting
properties. In particular, we have seen that the agents tend to become more
certain about their opinions with time and more interactions. After a while,
even the opinions of other agents with close opinions are disregarded as wrong,
since each one is very certain about their own ideas. Therefore, it is possible
to have some convergence of the population to a common value, but the agents
become stubborn and less capable of learning.
Two different kinds of extremism can be discussed this way. One, as observed
in the CODA model, correspond to a society where the agents have wildly
different opinions. This case is similar to what we have observed here when
the initial uncertainty is very small, since very different opinions can survive
at the end. But we have also observed a second, less dangerous kind, when
most agents have similar opinions, but are no longer capable of influencing each
other after a while. Since the social effect is basically agreement, it seems this is
better described as stuborness rather than true extremism and true extremism
should really be identified as extreme values of xi. In the evolving uncertainty
model, what we have observed is that, with time, agents may converge to close
opinions, but they become more and more stubborn about their own positions.
It is important to stress once more that these agents here are not Bayesian
agents and don’t have any higher cognitive abilities. The Bayesian rules were
actually used only in order to find reasonable rules of interactions. Once those
are found, the agents follow them in a dumb way. Modelling rational agents can
be an interesting project, but that was not the approach of this paper. We have
seen that there is another less complex option and simple rules can be a good
choice when we are interested only in the description of the population and not
the details of specific agents.
6 Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Fundac¸a˜o de Ampara a` Pesquisa do Estado de
Sa˜o Paulo (FAPESP), for the support to this work, under grant 2008/00383-9.
References
[1] E. Ben-Naim, P.L. Krapivsky, F. Vazqueza, and S. Redner. Unity and
discord in opinion dynamics. Physica A, 330:99–106, 2003.
[2] C. M. Bordogna and E. V. Albano. Statistical methods applied to the study
of opinion formation models: a brief overview and results of a numerical
8
study of a model based on the social impact theory. J. Phys.: Condens.
Matter, 19:065144, 2007.
[3] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato, and V. Loreto. Statistical physics of social
dynamics. arxiv:0710.3256, 2007.
[4] G. Deffuant. Comparing extremism propagation patterns in continuous
opinion models. JASSS-The Journal Of Artificial Societies And Social Sim-
ulation, 9:no. 3, 2006.
[5] G. Deffuant, D. Neau, F. Amblard, and G. Weisbuch. Mixing beliefs among
interacting agents. Adv. Compl. Sys., 3:87–98, 2000.
[6] S. Galam, Y. Gefen, and Y. Shapir. A new approach of sociological collec-
tive behavior. J. Math. Sociol., 9:1–13, 1982.
[7] S. Galam and S. Moscovici. Towards a theory of collective phenomena:
Consensus and attitude changes in groups. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol., 21:49–
74, 1991.
[8] R. Hegselmann and U. Krause. Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence
models, analysis and simulation. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulations, vol. 5, no. 3, 5(3), 2002.
[9] Andre´ C. R. Martins. Continuous opinions and discrete actions in opinion
dynamics problems. International Journal of Modern Physics C, 19(4):617–
624, 2008.
[10] Andre´ C. R. Martins. Mobility and social network effects on extremist
opinions. arXiv:0801.2411, 2008.
[11] D. Stauffer. How to convince others? monte carlo simulations of the sznajd
model. In J. E. Gubernatis, editor, AIP Conf. Proc. v. 690: The Monte
Carlo Method in the Physical Sciences: Celebrating the 50th Anniversary
of the Metropolis Algorithm, pages 147–155. American Institute of Physics,
2003.
[12] K. Sznajd-Weron and J. Sznajd. Opinion evolution in a closed community.
Int. J. Mod. Phys. C, 11:1157, 2000.
[13] D. Urbig. Attitude dynamics with limited verbalisation capabilities. Jour-
nal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulations, 6(1), 2003.
[14] G. Weisbuch, G. Deffuant, and F. Amblard. Persuasion dynamics. Physica
A, 353:555–575, 2005.
9
Figure 1: Time evolution of opinions for the fixed variance case, for 10,000
agents.
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Figure 2: Number of final opinions as a function of σ. Each point corresponds
to the average number of opinions for 10 realizations of the problem and the
error bars correspond to the standard deviation of that number.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of the opinions in the changing variance case. The
case shown corresponds to 10,000 agents, after a total of 1,000,000 interactions,
with initial uncertainty of 0.5.
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Figure 4: Fine details of the time evolution of the opinions in the changing
variance case. The case shown corresponds to 20,000 agents, after a total of
10,000,000 interactions, with initial variance of 0.01.
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Figure 5: Standard deviation of the final opinions as a function of initial un-
certainty. For an initial uncertainty of zero, the distribution is uniform and,
therefore, the standard deviation is 1/
√
12 ≈ 0.289
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